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Abstract
In 1994, Maudlin proposed proposed an objection to the transac-
tional interpretation (TI), involving an absorber that changes location
depending on the trajectory of the particle. Maudlin considered this
objection fatal. However, the TI did not die; rather, a number of re-
sponses were developed, some attempting to accommodate Maudlins
example within the existing TI, and others modifying the TI. I argue
that none of these responses is fully adequate. The reason, I submit,
is that there are two aspects to Maudlins objection; the more readily
soluble aspect has received all the attention, but the more problematic
aspect has gone unnoticed. I consider the prospects for developing a
succesful version of the TI in light of this second aspect of the objec-
tion.
1 Pseudotime explanation
The central explanatory mechanism of Cramers transactional interpretation
(TI) is the pseudotime sequence; o¤er waves are sent forwards in time from
the particle source to the potential absorbers, and then each absorber returns
a conrmation wave backwards in time to the source, and then a transaction
forms along one o¤er-conrmation pair with a probability given by the am-
plitude of the returning conrmation wave. But this explanatory mechanism
has always been regarded as problematic due to the backwards-causal link
embodied by the conrmation wave. The locution and thenin the pseudo-
time sequence cannot be understood temporally but then how should we
understand it? Indeed, Cramer himself describes the pseudotime sequence
as a semantic deviceand a pedagogical convention(1986, 661). But as
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Maudlin complains, all of the seeming illumination provided by the account
depends on the pseudotime narrative, so without the narrative there is no
explanation (1994, 198).
It seems to me that the pseudotime problem is a pseudoproblem, rest-
ing on the false assumption that all explanations are temporal explanations.
Another perfectly good form of explanation is the constraint problem; the
e¤ect we see is the only solution to the relevant equations, subject to some
applicable constraint. To pick a relevant example, the explanation of a stand-
ing wave on a string can be given this form; the standing wave patterns we
see are the solutions to the wave equation subject to the constraint that the
solution is stable over time. The reason this example is relevant is that,
as Cramer notes, the formation of a standing wave provides a good anal-
ogy to the formation of a transaction; an equally valid interpretation of
the process is that a four-vector standing wave has been established between
emitter and absorber(1986, 663). In the TI case, the solutions of the fun-
damental equations of quantum mechanics are retarded and advanced waves,
and the constraint that the result be a standing wave has a straightforward
justication in terms of consistency; anything but a standing wave would
ascribe inconsistent properties to spacetime points.
This understanding of pseudotime explanation puts the above narrative
on a perfectly secure footing; the locution and thencan be understood as
the then of explanation rather than the temporal then. The explana-
tion of the quantum statistics we see is that only certain o¤er-conrmation
pairs are consistent (the standing wave solutions), and nature chooses among
the consistent pairs according to the amplitudes of the conrmation waves.
Maybe the pseudotime sequence is a mere semantic device if regarded as a
temporal narrative, but it is not a mere semantic device if regarded as an
explanatory narrative; one should take it literally as the explanation of what
we see. Maudlin is right to note that all the illumination provided by the
TI depends on the pseudotime narrative, but wrong that the narrative is
incoherent.
2 Maudlins challenge
But taking the pseudotime narrative literally (as I think the adherent of the
TI must) lays one open to Maudlins main objection to the TI. Consider the
experiment shown schematically in g. 1. A particle is emitted at time t0.
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Figure 1: Maudlins experiment
If it follows the lower path it is detected by absorber A at time t1. If it
follows the upper path then A does not detect a particle at t1, which triggers
an absorber B to be swung from its initial position behind A to a point on
the upper path, where it detects the particle at a later time t2. Now what
happens if (by means of the beam-splitter S) a particle is produced in a
symmetric superposition of following the lower and upper paths? Standard
quantum mechanics tells us that there is a 50% chance that the particle is
detected at A and absorber B stays put, and a 50% chance that absorber B
swings round and the particle is detected at B.
How can TI account for these statistics? The puzzle here is that the
equiprobability of the two outcomes demands that equal amplitude conr-
mation waves be received from absorber A and absorber B. But if B sends
back a conrmation wave, then it must have been struck by an o¤er wave, so
it must have swung round. And if it has swung round, then the particle is not
detected at A. So when a conrmation wave is received from absorber B, the
particle must always go to absorber B, despite the fact that the amplitude of
the conrmation wave is 1/2. That is, the recipe for recovering the standard
quantum probabilities at the heart of the TI is inconsistent, and Maudlin
concludes that the TI collapses(1994, 200).
But the TI has not collapsed; a variety of responses have been developed,
either claiming to accommodate Maudlins example within the existing TI,
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or modifying the TI to accommodate it. I run through these responses in
the rst half of this paper, and argue that none of them is satisfactory.
The reason, I contend, is that there are two elements to Maudlins challenge
that have not been clearly distinguished. Distinguishing them allows us to
evaluate TI much more clearly.
3 Extant responses
Of the extant responses to Maudlins challenge, Berkovitz (2002), Kastner
(2006) and Marchildon (2006) attempt to accommodate Maudlins example
within the existing TI, and Cramer (2005), Kastner (2010) and Chiatti (2011)
work with modied versions of the TI. I will start with the former.
Berkovitz (2002) models Maudlins example as a causal loop, since the
conrmation wave returning backwards in time from B is necessary (and
su¢ cient) for the particle to be emitted towards B. Berkovitz then notes that
in causal loops the relative frequencies of events can di¤er signicantly from
their objective chances. So in this case, the fact that the particle always takes
the upper path when B swings round is not inconsistent with the upper path
having an objective chance of 1/2. However, it is not clear that Berkovitz
intends his analysis as a defense of the TI; he notes that since the link between
objective chance and long-run frequency is broken, the TI fails to predict the
long-run frequencies of outcomes. This is not a way forward for the advocate
of the TI.
Kastner (2006) identies the following as a problematic aspect of Maudlins
example; if absorber B does not swing round, then the o¤er wave on the upper
path heads into space, and no conrmation wave is received from the upper
path at the source. Typically in the TI, the conrmation waves returning
from a complete set of absorbers cancel out to the past of the initial emission
event. But in this case, the absence of a conrmation wave from the upper
path means that the conrmation wave from the lower path propagates into
the past, prior to t0. On the other hand, if B does swing round, then there is
a complete set of absorbers, and the conrmation waves do cancel out prior
to t0.
The lesson Kastner takes from this is that the emission event is not suit-
able as a starting-point for the TI analysis, since this event and its past
depend on whether B swings round or not, i.e. on the outcome of the exper-
iment. Instead, Kastner takes the o¤er-conrmation wave pair on the lower
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path as the starting point of her analysis, since this pair exists whether B
swings round or not. The conrmation wave here has an amplitude of 1/2,
and so Kastner reasons that the corresponding transaction in which the
particle takes the lower path where it is absorbed by A has a probability of
1/2. But the only other possibility is that the particle takes the upper path
where it is absorbed by B, so this also must have a probability of 1/2. This
recovers the standard quantum mechanical probabilities.
But this account is problematic in two regards. First, events prior to the
emission event do not depend on the outcome of the experiment as Kastner
claims; everything up to the emission event is exactly the same whether the
particle is absorbed by A or by B. So something must be amiss if her analysis
entails this about the past. Second, Kastners analysis self-consciously rejects
the usual pseudotime analysis. I argued above that the pseudotime analysis
is a necessary part of the TI; without it, as Kastner herself admits we dont
as yet even have a heuristic way to understand this process(2006, 9).
Marchildon (2006) corrects Kastners point about the past. He notes
that when B does not swing round, the o¤er wave along the upper path
is still absorbed somewhere; a particle taking this path would be absorbed
by something eventually. Due to the retrocausal nature of the pseudotime
sequence, it makes no di¤erence how far in the future this absorption event
lies; the conrmation wave is still received by the particle source at t0. One
may as well assume that there is a third absorber C, situated on the upper
path beyond the point B swings to. Hence a complete set of conrmation
waves is received at the particle source whether or not B swings round, and
in either case the conrmation waves cancel out prior to t0.
Maudlins example remains problematic, however; if B does not swing
round, the new absorber C returns a conrmation wave with amplitude 1/2,
and yet no transaction is ever completed with C. Marchildon attempts to dis-
solve this problem by appealing to the four-dimensional space-time implicit
in the TI; the future, though not predictable, is well dened(2006, 427).
The four-dimensional blockworldis subject to consistency conditions, and
in the present case, these conditions are that B absorbs the particle if and
only if A does not absorb it(2006, 427). Given this consistency condition,
there are just two possible trajectories, and each is ascribed the probability
corresponding to the amplitude of its respective conrmation wave, i.e. 1/2.
But to appeal to the existence of two possible trajectories here is, again,
to bypass the pseudotime sequence entirely. The pseudotime sequence de-
scribes two possibilities if B swings around (absorption by A and by B) and
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two possibilities if B does not swing around (absorption by A and by C). The
probability rule of the TI fails in such cases, because it ascribes probability
1/2 to each of these four outcomes, which is inconsistent (Wharton, Cyber
Roundtable). It is certainly true that only two of these are genuine possi-
bilities, but one cannot appeal to this fact to rescue the TI, since this is the
conclusion that the TI is supposed to yield, not additional input to the TI. If
one wants to rescue the TI as a genuine explanatory theory, one has to nd
some way for the pseudotime sequence and its associated probability rule to
apply to Maudlins example.
Cramer (2005) attempts to do just that, by modifying the way that
pseudotime explanations are constructed. In the standard TI, all possible
transactions have the same status; what Cramer proposes is a hierarchy of
possible transactions, ordered by the spacetime interval between the begin-
ning and end of the transaction. That is, transactions with shorter spacetime
interval are given the opportunity to form or not form before(in pseudo-
time) those with longer spacetime interval. This takes care of Maudlins
example, since the possible transaction with absorber A is decided rst. The
pseudotime sequence now goes like this: The o¤er-conrmation pair to ab-
sorber A is treated rst, and since it has amplitude 1/2, there is a probability
of 1/2 of a transaction forming with A. If it fails to form, then absorber B
swings round, and the o¤er-conrmation pair to absorber B can be consid-
ered; it too has amplitude 1/2, corresponding to a probability 1/2 of this
transaction forming.
But the hierarchical pseudotime sequence envisioned here is not a fully
general solution to the problem; it will not work for Maudlin-type experi-
ments involving photons, since in that case the spacetime interval for every
possible transaction will be zero (Miller, Cyber Roundtable). Furthermore, it
is hard to motivate the hierarchy from within the TI; the conrmation waves
from closer absorbers do not arrive at the emission point rst, so the resultant
explanation seems to rest on a ction. The hierarchy looks suspiciously ad
hoc when applied to cases that do not have the Maudlin contingent-absorber
structure; why should shorter transactions be decided rst in such contexts
(Marchildon, Cyber Roundtable)? That is, the relevant structure here is
causal structure, not spacetime structure, and Cramers hierarchy fails to
capture this aspect of Maudlins example.
Kastner (2010) suggests that the way to retain the status of pseudotime
histories as genuine explanations is to adopt a modal realist ontology; all
possible transactions exist in a (real) space of possibilities. She calls the
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resulting modication of the theory possibilist TI (PTI). But it is not
clear that reifying the possible transactions helps with Maudlins challenge
in fact, it brings his criticism into sharper focus. If the pseudotime sequence
describes a genuine process occurring in a space of possibilities, then the
inconsistencies in the pseudotime sequence for the Maudlin example cannot
be waved away.
Chiatti (2011) regards the TI pseudotime sequence as superuous, since
he thinks that the structure of transactions can be found within the formal-
ism of standard quantum mechanics. The way to do this, he argues, is to
adopt an ontology of particle creation/destruction events; these are the only
events that physically exist, and the TI o¤er and conrmation waves are
a mathematical ction suited to calculate the statistics of the connection
between a pair of events (2011, 2). The physical universe is regarded as a
network of particle creation/destruction events, with the TI o¤er and conr-
mation waves serving only to coordinate the statistical relations among these
events.
Chiatti claims that in this context, Maudlins argument is unfounded be-
cause the two possible transactions have di¤erent events at their extremities;
absorption by A is a di¤erent event than absorption by B. Di¤erent extremal
events entail di¤erent TI-style analyses, and hence we have two simple ap-
plications of the theory, not one paradoxical one. But this decoupling of the
problem fails to show how the event of B-absorption is related to that of A-
absorption. However, Chiatti has a suggestion here, namely that the event
(not A)+(not A)  is itself a transaction termination (null interaction), so
that the second transaction assumes as its input the output state of the
rst(2011, 28). The suggestion is that the event of a particle not being ab-
sorbed by A can serve as the terminal event of a transaction, with probability
1/2, and this event can also serve as the initial event of a second transaction
that ends with a particle absorbed by B. The trouble with this suggestion is
that a null interaction a particle failing to be destroyed is not a physical
event in Chiattis ontology, so it is hard to see how it can serve as the termi-
nal event in a transaction. There are not two back-to-back transactions here,
but a single transaction with a complex structure. As a mathematical ction
Chiattis proposal may be acceptable; the main problem is that Chiatti, like
several others, rejects the pseudotime sequence as genuinely explanatory, and
hence robs the TI of its explanatory mechanism.
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4 The rst challenge
It looks like none of the extant responses to Maudlins challenge are adequate,
at least if one insists on nding a role for the pseudotime sequence in the
TI. The feature of Maudlins argument to which all commentators have been
attempting to respond is the contingent nature of the absorber structure
the fact that the locations of the absorbers depend on the trajectory of the
particle. This is not surprising, since Maudlin himself describes his challenge
in these terms: This picture depends crucially on the idea that the absorbers
are somehow just sitting out there in the future, waiting to absorb... But
there is no reason for the absorbers to be xed in the future, una¤ected
by everything that happens in the present (1994, 199). However, I think
the contingent structure of the absorbers is only one element of Maudlins
challenge, and not the most problematic one.
First, note that Maudlins experiment involves a mixed quantum/classical
system; the particle is a quantum system, but the movable absorber is a clas-
sical (macroscopic) system. This, though, looks like an expendable feature of
Maudlins example; one could make all the subsystems quantum mechanical,
and still retain the contingent absorber structure. For example, consider the
following variant of the experiment (g. 2). If a particle is emitted along the
lower path, it collides with a carefully-timed incoming anti-particle (dotted
line) at t1. The two particles annihilate, and the resulting photon is detected
at A. If a particle is emitted along the upper path, then clearly the anti-
particle doesnt encounter it at t1; instead, the antiparticle travels on, and
collides with the particle at a later time t2 on the upper path. This time the
resulting photon is detected at B.
The moving parts in this version of Maudlins experiment are all quan-
tum systems, but the absorber structure is just as in the original version,
with the anti-particle playing the role of the moving absorber. There is a
slight di¤erence, namely that in the original version there are two absorbers,
one of which moves, whereas in the new version there is just one moving
absorber. But this is unimportant; in the original version, it could just as
well be absorber A that moves to the upper path when it fails to detect
a particle on the lower path. So if it is the contingent absorber structure
that is the problematic aspect of Maudlins example, it ought to be just as
problematic in this version. But it does not appear so; one can construct a
fairly straightforward pseudotime narrative in this case that yields the right
probabilities.
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Figure 2: Maudlin experiment: Quantum version
Here is how it goes. A particle and an anti-particle are emitted at the
beginning of the experiment, so let us write the initial o¤er wave as jOip jOia.
The o¤er wave for the particle is split by the beam-splitter into two equal
components, following the lower path and upper path respectively; at this
stage, we can write the total o¤er wave as
1p
2

jLip + jUip

jOia : (1)
The o¤er wave for the anti-particle travels towards the lower path, where it is
split into two terms depending on whether it meets the particle on the lower
branch or not. That is, the term jLip jOia in (1) evolves to jLip jLia, where
jLia is an o¤er wave for the anti-particle that encounters the particle on the
lower branch. The term jUip jOia in (1) evolves to jUip jUia, where jUia is an
o¤er wave for the anti-particle that travels onwards through the lower path
and encounters the particle on the upper path. Hence the superposition state
(1) as a whole evolves to the later(in pseudotime) superposition state
1p
2

jLip jLia + jUip jUia

: (2)
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Each term returns a conrmation wave from the point at which the parti-
cle and anti-particle annihilate; the rst term returns a conrmation wave
1
2
hLjp hLja, and the second term returns a conrmation wave 12 hU jp hU ja.
Hence the (dual) source receives two conrmation waves, each with ampli-
tude 1=2, and a transaction forms along one of the o¤er-conrmation pairs
with probability 1=2 each. This pseudotime narrative hence successfully as-
cribes probabilities of 1/2 each to the two possible transactions the one in
which the particles annihilate on the lower path, and the one in which they
annihilate on the upper path.
Hence TI can account for the standard quantum probabilities in contingent-
absorber experiments without any new di¢ culties or any modications. Why,
then, has Maudlins example been taken to be so problematic?
5 The second challenge
The reason is that the contingent absorber structure in Maudlins example
is not instantiated by quantum systems, but by classical (macroscopic) ob-
jects. As explained in the previous section, the straightforward and natural
response to the contingent absorber problem just sketched involves incor-
porating the absorber (the anti-particle) into the TI pseudotime analysis,
rather than treating it as part of the environment. But such incorporation
is far more problematic if we need to incorporate the state of a macroscopic
object into our TI analysis. There are two tricky issues that arise when one
contemplates treating a macroscopic object as falling within the scope of a
TI analysis. The rst issue concerns whether the proposed analysis even
makes sense; it depends on the way in which TI practitioners conceive of
their theory. The second issue concerns the nuts and bolts of constructing
such an analysis, given that it makes sense.
To understand the rst issue, a little broad-brush history will help. In
broad terms, there are two traditions in the interpretation of quantum me-
chanics. The rst, harkening back to Bohr and Heisenberg, takes the dis-
tinction between the quantum world and the classical world as basic; call
this the Copenhagen tradition. According to this tradition, the world (or at
least, the part of it relevant to a given experiment) divides into system and
apparatus. The apparatus belongs to the world of experience, and behaves
classically. The apparatus delivers results which we take to be produced by
an unseen micro-world. Quantum mechanics does not describe the workings
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of this micro-world directly, but rather describes what we should expect to
see when the apparatus interacts with the system. On this view, the sys-
tem/apparatus divide is built into the theory of quantum mechanics itself;
the observables of the theory correspond to the operations of applying various
pieces of macroscopic measuring equipment to the quantum system. Quan-
tum mechanics applies to the interaction between classical measuring devices
and quantum systems, and so any attempt to apply quantum mechanics to
the measuring equipment itself is fundamentally misguided.
The TI is naturally understood as part of this Copenhagen tradition as
a way of making it more precise. Emitters and absorbers are part of the
classical world; we arrange them in constructing an experiment, and we ob-
serve the results they present. TI quantum mechanics generates probabilistic
predictions based on the particular arrangement of emitters and absorbers
we have constructed. On this understanding of the TI, it is about the inter-
action of an unseen quantum world with a given arrangement of emitters and
absorbers. To attempt to incorporate the absorber itself into a TI analysis
on this view is like trying to incorporate the concert hall into an acoustic
analysis; the concert hall, like the arrangement of emitters and absorbers,
constitutes the environment in which the analysis takes place. If we under-
stand the TI in this way, of course, then the straightforward route to resolving
Maudlins rst challenge is blocked as a matter of principle; there is no way
round.
But there is a second tradition in the interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics, stretching from Einstein and Schrödinger through Bell to Maudlin; call
this (without too much prejudice, I hope) the realist tradition. According
to this tradition, quantum mechanics really does describe the workings of
the micro-world, not just system/apparatus interactions. The observables of
quantum mechanics should not be conceived in terms of measurement op-
erations, but in terms of actual properties of the quantum system; they are
beables rather than observables, in Bells memorable phrase (Bell 1987, 174).
On this view, there is no signicant distinction between the micro-world and
the macro-world; quantum mechanics applies just as much to the latter as
to the former, since macroscopic systems are built out of microscopic ones.
Hence quantum mechanics can be applied unproblematically to the measur-
ing devices themselves. There is no reason in principle why the TI cant be
thought of in these terms; perhaps some of its practitioners do so. If so, the
rst tricky issue is a non-issue; there is nothing in principle to prevent the
incorporation of a macroscopic absorber into a TI analysis.
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It is worth noting here that the realist tradition faces a problem that
doesnt arise in the Copenhagen tradition; quantum mechanics treats mea-
surements di¤erently from non-measurements (only the former trigger col-
lapse), but if measurements are themselves quantum processes this distinc-
tion cannot arise. Various responses to this measurement problem have been
developed, and it is interesting that all of them (or at least all the major ones)
treat Maudlins experiment by including absorber B in the system to be an-
alyzed. This is most obvious in the Everett (many-worlds) theory. Applying
Everett to Maudlins original experiment yields the following nal state:
1p
2

jLip jY iA jN;LiB + jUip jNiA jY; UiB

; (3)
where jY iA and jNiA are states of A in which it does and does not absorb a
particle, and jN;LiB and jY; UiB are states of B in which it doesnt absorb
a particle and remains on the lower branch, and does absorb a particle after
swinging to the upper branch. The existence of these two terms, according
to the Everettian, explains the observed results; in one branch of reality the
particle takes the lower path and is absorbed by A, and in the other branch
of reality the particle takes the upper path and absorber B swing round to
absorb it there. Bohms hidden variables theory tells essentially the same
story, except that one branch is associated with the Bohmian particles, and
hence corresponds to the actual result. The GRW collapse theory appeals to
the instability of (3) under its collapse dynamics to account for the fact that
the nal state is (close to) one of the two terms. The lesson (to generalize a
little) seems to be that one has to incorporate absorber B into the quantum
mechanical analysis if one is to give any adequate account of the Maudlin
experiment.
As mentioned above, provided that the TI is seen as a direct account
of the micro-world in the spirit of the realist tradition, there is nothing to
prevent it doing just that. But the details of how this is to be accomplished
remain somewhat murky; this is the second tricky issue advertised above.
The immediate problem is that the TI analysis (as it stands) admits only two
kinds of end-points emission events and absorption events. To be subject to
TI analysis, particles must be followed from birth to death. But the particles
that make up absorber B are not emitted at the start of the experiment
or absorbed at the end. If we have to know the full life-history of all the
particles that make up absorber B before we can apply the TI, the theory
becomes impossible to apply.
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However, the details of the evolution of the particles in B before and after
the experiment seem irrelevant to the analysis at hand. So perhaps the TI
can avail itself of the following harmless myth; pretend that all the particles
involved in the analysis are created at the beginning of the experiment and
destroyed at the end. This myth might be justied by appealing to the
fact that wherever and whenever the particles in B are actually created and
destroyed, the o¤er and conrmation waves over the course of the experiment
will correspond to their mythical counterparts. If that justication works,
and the myth is adopted, then a pseudotime narrative for Maudlins original
experiment can be given along the lines of the previous section.
Here is how it goes. According to the myth, the test particle and all the
particles in B are emitted at the beginning of the experiment. Let us write
the initial o¤er wave as jOip jN;LiB (using the same notation as above), since
B is initially in a state in which it is on the lower path and has not absorbed
a particle. The o¤er wave for the particle is split by the beam-splitter into
two equal components, following the lower path and upper path respectively;
at this stage, we can write the total o¤er wave as
1p
2

jLip + jUip

jN;LiB : (4)
The term jLip jN;LiB in (4) evolves to jLip jN;LiB, and the term jUip jN;LiB
evolves to jUip jY; UiB; hence the superposition state (1) as a whole evolves
to the later(in pseudotime) superposition state
1p
2

jLip jN;LiB + jUip jY; UiB

: (5)
Note (5) is exactly the same as the Everettian nal state (3), except that ab-
sorber A has not been included in the current analysis. Applying the myth
again, we assume the test particle and all the particles in B are destroyed
at this point, so that each term in (5) returns a conrmation wave. from
the point at which the particle and anti-particle annihilate; the rst term
returns a conrmation wave 1
2
hLjp hN;LjB, and the second term returns a
conrmation wave 1
2
hU jp hY; U jB. Hence the source receives two conrma-
tion waves, and a transaction forms along one of the o¤er-conrmation pairs
with probability 1=2 each. This pseudotime narrative successfully ascribes
probabilities of 1/2 each to the two possible transactions the one in which
the particles takes the lower path and B stays put, and the one in which the
particle takes the upper path and B swings round.
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6 Transactions and trajectories
So has the Maudlin puzzle been solved? The pseudotime sequence just
sketched constitutes what I take to be the most natural, and perhaps the
only, available solution. But at what cost have we arrived at this solution?
We have had to nd a way to incorporate the analysis of pieces of measuring
equipment into the TI analysis. Some may nd this price too high, and with
good reason.
At issue is the uniqueness of classical trajectories in the TI. It is important
to note that TI transactions are not always particle trajectories. Two-slit in-
terference is a case in point; the completed transaction goes through both
slits to a point on the screen, so the transaction is not a determinate particle
trajectory, but a superposition of such trajectories. In fact, this is a generic
feature of interference; whenever two or more distinct o¤er waves contribute
to the amplitude at the absorption point, the resulting transaction incor-
porates the trajectories corresponding to all the o¤er waves to that point.
So the TI does not always recover determinate particle trajectories as e.g.
Bohms theory does. But provided such indeterminacy is kept conned to
the micro-world, this is not a problem.
The worry about incorporating macroscopic objects into the TI analy-
sis is that it opens the door for macroscopic objects to have indeterminate
trajectories. Thanks to decoherence, interference e¤ects are tiny for macro-
scopic objects, but they do not go away entirely. So in my treatment of the
Maudlin experiment above, the amplitudes of the terms in (5) are a¤ected
by the presence of anomalous interference terms. For example, there are low-
amplitude terms in which the particle takes the upper path and absorber B
swings round, but then at the last instant they veer back to the lower path
to coincide with the rst term in (5). So in reality, the wave amplitude at
the lower-path location for B includes tiny contributions from o¤er waves
that have not travelled via the lower path. According to the TI, then, the
completed transaction contains a large contribution following the standard
trajectory, but also minor contributions following the anomalous trajectories.
This might seem to threaten the determinacy of trajectories for macroscopic
objects, either rendering the TI empirically inadequate or turning it into a
baroque version of Everett.
But perhaps such worries can be deected; the additional terms are, after
all, very small. One might quite reasonably insist that a transaction in
which one trajectory is so dominant simply is, for all practical purposes,
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that trajectory. Provided that no signicant interference occurs involving
macroscopic objects, the determinacy of macro-trajectories is (arguably) safe.
However, there is a further worry that cannot be dealt with in this way. If
the TI is interpreted in the realist tradition, there is nothing to prevent it
being applied to the state of the universe as a whole (just as Everett, Bohm
and GRW can be so applied). Indeed, this is one of the touted advantages
of the realist tradition. One wouldnt need the myth for such an application;
we really would be following every particle from birth to death. But there
is no guarantee that interference between macroscopically distinct terms can
be suppressed in such an application; it depends on the global structure of
the universe. For example, in highly symmetric universes, branching in the
initial stages of the universe might be matched by reverse branching(i.e.
interference) in the nal stages. In that case, there would be no unique
trajectory corresponding to the evolution of the macroscopic objects in the
universe, and again the TI would either be empirically inadequate or reduce
to a version of Everett.
One might be tempted to dismiss such cosmological speculation, and trust
that the universe will have a structure amenable to the application of the TI.
But it is at least unclear whether the TI can be unproblematically applied to
macroscopic objects. Without such application, though, Maudlins challenge
retains its power against the TI.
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